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ABSTRACT
European administrative networks (EANs) are a key building block of the
European Administrative Space (EAS). Crucially, they are to fill the gap
between the EU’s policy ambitions and its limited administrative capacities.
Whereas ample research has been done on policy preparation networks, the
role of implementing EANs has received less attention in the EAS literature.
This article fills this gap by providing a systematic review of relevant insights
in four adjacent literatures: EU governance; international relations; public
administration; and EU compliance. Employing a systematic literature review,
it reports divergent findings on EAN establishment, functioning and impact,
as well as variant normative evaluations. These variant findings partly relate to
a lack of comparative research, selective policy coverage and predominant
focus on North-western states. We conclude by suggesting a number of lines
for future research on these four important themes, arguing that the crucial
question will be which impact these EANs have on the national
implementation and enforcement of EU law.
KEYWORDS European administrative networks; European administrative space; European Commission;
enforcement; implementation; regulatory governance.
Introduction
The European Commission is the core executive of the European Union (EU).
However, its resources pale into insignificance compared to those of national
administrations (Metcalfe 2000; Trondal 2010) and compared to its tasks
(Olsen 2003: 514). Its lack of financial and personnel capacities complicates
important administrative functions (Majone 2000). In addition, it has limited
formal powers, especially in the realm of implementation and enforcement.
Accordingly, the Commission depends on the loyal co-operation of national
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authorities to achieve policy outcomes (Majone 2000; Trondal and Peters
2013: 295).
To compensate for these deficiencies, the EU has developed a ‘European
Administrative Space (EAS)’1 or ‘European Executive Order’ (Trondal 2010):
‘an area in which increasingly integrated administrations jointly exercise
powers delegated to the EU in a system of shared sovereignty’ (Hofmann
2008: 671). The existing EAS literature has mainly mapped the administrative
space around the Commission’s policy development and decision-making
tasks, i.e., seconded national experts, European agencies and EU committees
(Trondal 2010; Trondal and Peters 2013). A fourth type of EAS ‘filling’ are net-
works of national administrative entities with a task in implementation
(Hofmann 2008). Recent years have seen an increase in work on these ‘imple-
menting EANs’ in four literatures: EU governance (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote
2009); international relations theory (Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2004); public
administration (Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Yesilkagit 2011); and EU com-
pliance (Versluis and Tarr 2013). This article takes stock of these literatures2
with an aim of developing a research agenda to facilitate more systematic
and comparative work on the role of EANs in EU implementation and enfor-
cement. It does so along four main themes: conceptualization; establishment;
functioning and impact of EANs (cf. Bach et al. 2016; Thatcher 2011). Consecu-
tively, we reflect on the normative aspects of EANs. We conclude with an
agenda for research, arguing that the crucial question for further research
will be which impact these EANs have on the national implementation and
enforcement of EU law.
Conceptualizing European administrative networks
The EAS refers to the institutionalization of common administrative capacity
(Trondal and Peters 2013: 295). The literature has emphasized networks of
national regulatory agencies – often dubbed European regulatory networks/
ERNs (Blauberger and Rittberger 2015; Coen and Thatcher 2005, 2008;
Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Maggetti 2014a, 2014b; Maggetti and Gilardi
2011, 2014; Newman 2008; Van Boetzelaer and Princen 2012; Yesilkagit 2011).
Yet, several other terms have been used: networks (Versluis and Tarr 2013);
transnational regulatory networks (Eberlein and Grande 2005); transnational
administrative networks (Bach et al. 2016); transnational networks (Wilks
2005); administrative networks (Martens 2008a); and transgovernmental net-
works (Bignami 2005; Eberlein and Newman 2008; Hobolth and Martinsen
2013; Hollis 2010; Martens 2008b; Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2004).
Arguably, all these labels refer to a particular type of EANs: networks that
consist of institutional representatives of national executives – primarily
departments and/or agencies – with tasks in the realm of national implemen-
tation or enforcement of EU policies. These ‘implementing EANs’ may also
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include European actors (Coen and Thatcher 2008; Eberlein and Newman
2008; Martens 2008b; Slaughter 2004; Thurner and Binder 2009). Whereas
the literature has primarily focused on regulatory networks (Levi-Faur 2011),
they can also be executive in nature3 (e.g., Hobolth and Martinsen 2013;
Hollis 2010).
Whereas implementing EANs share overall membership features (represen-
tatives from national executives) and tasks (implementation or enforcement),
they may differ considerably in structure and functions. The American litera-
ture on transgovernmental networks (TGNs) has come closest to a typology.
While generally horizontal in structure, (Slaughter and Hale 2010: 358),
TGNs vary according to their functions: information enforcement or harmoni-
zation networks (Slaughter 2004: 51–61). However, EANs may be more vertical
or sectoral in structure, with considerable involvement of the Commission or a
European agency (Bach and Ruffing 2013). They may span a wider range of
functions than the TGN typology suggests. These unknowns call for further
mapping of EAN functions, both in their own right and in comparison with
their international counterparts.
EAN establishment
The original argument on EAN establishment is functionalist in nature. Net-
works close the gap between the supranational making and national
implementation of common rules (Blauberger and Rittberger 2015: 369; Coen
and Thatcher 2008; Dehousse 1997; Eberlein and Grande 2005: 99; Groenleer
et al. 2010; Hofmann 2008: 666). By pooling resources (Börzel and Heard-
Lauréote 2009), specifically expertise (Kelemen and Tarrant 2011: 924), EANs
may foster problem-solving (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009), enhance Com-
munity regulatory credibility and efficiency, and insulate independent regulat-
ory agencies (IRAs) from political pressures (Coen and Thatcher 2005; Majone
2000). EANs thus form a logical response to the interdependencies of
modern times (Busuioc 2016), combined with the reluctance to establish all
too powerful EU-regulators (Blauberger and Rittberger 2015; Coen and Thatcher
2008: 60–61; Dehousse 1997; Eberlein and Newman 2008; Kelemen and Tarrant
2011; Thatcher and Coen 2008). Employing principal–agent (PA) theory, Coen
and Thatcher (2005, 2008) consider the establishment of ERNs a form of
‘double delegation’ by the European Commission and national regulatory
agencies – occurring after earlier delegation to those actors.
These functionalist theories have received extensive criticism. First, they do
not serve to theorize the choice between three different delegation pathways,
i.e., the Commission, EU agencies and EANs, or variations in design choices
across policy-making areas and over time (Kelemen and Tarrant 2011).
Second, functionalism is largely devoid of politics. Given the fact that the
EU does not have one clear principal, understanding the creation of EANs
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requires careful studying of the various principals and their preferences
(Dehousse 2008). This insight paves the way for a more political-strategic
view of EAN establishment.
So far, the literature has not produced theoretical nor empirical consensus
on the types of strategic considerations that matter for EAN establishment.4
Suggested variables include the degree of distributional conflict in a policy
area (Kelemen and Tarrant 2011), governments’ agreement on underlying
policy objectives (Bignami 2005), and possibilities to engage in bypassing of
national governments (Maggetti 2014a), institutional rivalry (Thatcher 2011)
and bureaucratic self-interest (Busuioc 2016). Surprisingly, substantive policy
preferences of key players have hardly received attention (but see Bignami
2005), which is a remarkable departure from delegation theories more
broadly. Furthermore, Kassim and Wright (2009) have challenged the political
view of EAN establishment for its neglect of the complexity of negotiations,
the importance of external circumstances and the restraint of the Commission
in dominating EANs (Kassim and Wright 2009).
Furthermore, the verdict on the use of functionalist versus political
accounts is still out. Blauberger and Rittberger (2015), have argued that func-
tionalist explanations have the best cards to explain the particular form of a
co-ordination structure, while political explanations can explain variations in
the particular design of such a structure. This integrative approach must still
be empirically validated.
Non-rationalist explanations to EAN establishment have in general been
rare. Coen and Thatcher (2005, 2008) alluded to the importance of informal
resources and copying for the establishment of EANs (Coen and Thatcher
2005, 2008) A key insight flowing from their work is that an understanding
of network creation must encompass more than only the formal principals
(Coen and Thatcher 2008). Furthermore, Kassim and Wright’s work (2009)
explains the establishment of the European Competition Network as contin-
gent on a rather consensual, expertise-driven process of debate and
deliberation.
Employing historical institutionalism, thirdly, Thatcher and Coen (2008)
developed a historical account of the development of structures for
implementation in three network sectors. They identified a gradual strength-
ening of EANs, owing to processes of layering and conversion. Mathieu (2015)
showed that processes of EAN establishment in the field of telecommunica-
tion flowed from previous steps to establish and strengthen national agencies
(Mathieu 2015). Thatcher (2011), finally, argued that the construction of for-
malized EANs may hinder the creation of strong European agencies. Levi-
Faur (2011), however, found that agencies may also replace networks, while
hybrid institutional forms may also result.
The empirical insights on EAN establishment mostly derive from qualitative
(comparative) case studies. Most attention has gone to network sectors such
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as competition policy (Blauberger and Rittberger 2015; Kassim and Wright
2009; McGowan 2005; Thatcher 2011; Wilks 2005), telecommunications
(Blauberger and Rittberger 2015; Coen and Thatcher 2005, 2008; Eberlein
and Grande 2005; Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; Majone 2000; Mathieu 2015;
Thatcher 2011; Thatcher and Coen 2008) and energy (Coen and Thatcher
2005, 2008; Eberlein and Grande 2005; Eberlein and Newman 2008; Thatcher
2011; Thatcher and Coen 2008), at the expense of sectors of ‘positive inte-
gration’ like environment, social policy and food safety. As shown by Table
1 in the Online Appendix, no attention has been paid to the following (sub-
) domains: international trade; taxation; education; agriculture and fishing;
undertaking laws; state subsidies; foreign policy; foreign aid; migration;
employment; and structural/regional funds. It is not clear whether these
sectors do not have EANs, or whether they simply have not been studied.
Furthermore, all research, with the exception of Levi-Faur (2011) has con-
cerned ‘positive’ cases, tracing back reasons for establishment of EANs. We
recommend also following the opposite strategy, and testing hypotheses
on EAN establishment in likely cases based on the independent variables,
which would allow for stronger theory-testing. The recent work of Levi-Faur
(2011), which has regulatory regimes as its unit of analysis, constitutes a
good first step in that direction.
EAN functioning
According to Hofmann (2008), administrative co-operation has led to ‘inten-
sive and often seamless co-operation between national and supranational
administrative actors and activities.’ Kelemen and Tarrant (2011: 925),
however, criticize this ‘overly sanguine view’, arguing that EANs sometimes
actually are designed to be ineffective (ibid., 923). These divergent positions
characterize the literature on the actual functioning of EANs, which revolves
around three key factors which condition such functioning: the co-operation
between network members; the Commission’s control of the network; and
the autonomy of the network members vis-à-vis national governments.
Firstly, Cengiz (2010) and Vifell and Sjögren (2014) reported active and
stable co-operation in the European Competition Network and SOLVIT – an
important antecedent of network functionality (Cengiz 2010; Vifell and
Sjögren 2014). Others established variant co-operation within EANs, linked
to the reputational considerations of participating agencies (Busuioc 2016)
and levels of interdependence (Van Boetzelaer and Princen 2012). Recently,
Heidbreder pointed to horizontal co-operation between national bureauc-
racies without much vertical co-ordination as improving the enforcement of
international trade agreements (Heidbreder 2015).
Regarding the matter of control, most research concerns the role of the
Commission in EANs – which is disputed. Martens (2008b) and Hobolth and
426 E. MASTENBROEK AND D. SINDBJERG MARTINSEN
Martinsen (2013) found the Commission to play a proactive role, using net-
works strategically. Busuioc (2016) sketched a series of strategic moves by
the Commission aimed at conditioning EAN development. Levi-Faur (2011:
823) reported that both EU agencies and the Commission make considerable
investments in institutionalizing EANs as their agents. However, this analysis
builds on a rather institutional and remote operationalization of EAN indepen-
dence – agenda control and financial relations. The analysis leaves open the
question of behavioural patterns. Here, we should stress the evidence
against Commission dominance. Kassim and Wright (2009), firstly, reported
striking restraint of the European Commission within the European Compe-
tition Network, which is seen by some as a clever move by the Commission
to ‘engineer ever greater centralization of competition decision-making’
(McGowan 2005: 1001). Other scholars, however, address the issue of
control beyond the Commission, discussing how national interests control
and restrict the capacities of EANs to push through regulatory harmonization
(Coen and Thatcher 2008; Kelemen and Tarrant 2011).
Thirdly, several researchers have analysed the effects of EAN membership
on national agencies’ formal and de-facto autonomy vis-à-vis national govern-
ments. The assumption is that ‘ERNs enable the Commission to indirectly draw
on national regulatory agencies and leverage their authority in order to ensure
consistent and effective application of EU regulation’ (Eberlein and Newman
2008: 26). A crucial question, therefore, is whether EANs alter relationships
between national agencies and their ministries (Danielsen and Yesilkagit
2014). Indeed, various researchers observed that EAN membership may actu-
ally serve to enhance agency autonomy (Bach and Ruffing 2013; Danielsen
and Yesilkagit 2014). As stressed by Yesilkagit (2011: 967), autonomy of
national agencies may derive from institutional compliance with EU legis-
lation, expertise and knowledge production by the EAN (Yesilkagit 2011).
According to Egeberg (2006), however, we should distinguish between the
several stages of the policy cycle. During policy development and transposi-
tion, agencies are fairly attentive to their ministers (ibid., 10). These cannot
be bypassed during transposition, given the need for binding national
decisions (Bach et al. 2015). During implementation, however, the agencies’
more often act on behalf the Commission and sister agencies in the
network (Egeberg 2006: 10–11). Finally, as shown in Table 1 (Online Appen-
dix), the above results are based on a small, non-representative sample of
states: Germany; the Netherlands; Sweden; Finland; Denmark; and non-
member Norway.
EAN impact
The litmus test for EANs concerns their actual impact: can they really close the
‘implementation gap’ they are to solve? Thus impact concerns the ability of
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EANs to realize their policy objectives, such as improved national implemen-
tation or more harmonized enforcement of EU law. Several authors have
documented EANs’ role in adopting and promoting common standards at
the national level (Maggetti 2014a: 493; Maggetti and Gilardi 2011;
Maggetti and Gilardi 2014). Reportedly, this is especially the case for national
agencies with network centrality (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011) and for EANs
where supranational actors play a ‘nodal role’ (Versluis and Tarr 2013). EANs
are found to be effective in ‘closing the existing regulatory lacunae at the
European level’ (Eberlein and Grande 2005: 106), albeit to varying degrees
across member states (Hobolth and Martinsen 2013). Crucial, again, seems
to be national agencies’ formal autonomy from the ministry (Yesilkagit
2011). However, other scholars remain sceptical about EANs capacity to effec-
tively improve the implementation of EU law (Coen and Thatcher 2008;
Kelemen and Tarrant 2011).
Most explanations of EAN impact are rationalist in nature. Several authors
have used PA theory (Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Maggetti 2007, 2014a,
2014b; Yesilkagit 2011), connecting EAN impact to intentional design,
bounded rationality and control problems (Bach and Ruffing 2013), empower-
ment of agencies (Bach and Newman 2010; Bach et al. 2015), strategic use
of information (Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Eberlein and Grande 2005)
and the hierarchy between ministry and agency (Martens 2008a). At the
level of individual agency members, organizational variables like vertical
and horizontal specialization have been suggested (Trondal 2011). Finally,
peer pressure and reputational dynamics may play a role (Maggetti and
Gilardi 2011: 830).
Alternatively, several authors have employed sociological institutionalism
to explain EAN impact. Typically, this literature views networks as platforms
for continuous interaction between their members, allowing them to
engage in knowledge exchange, persuasion and learning – which may lead
to the development of joint operating practices (Hobolth and Martinsen
2013: 1411). Accordingly, the capacities of networks can be explained by
the way interaction between peers furthers mutual understanding, dialogue
and trust (Cengiz 2010; Heidbreder 2015). By interacting on a routine basis,
actors are socialized into shared logics and practices. Networks thus may sup-
plement or replace coercive enforcement (Versluis and Tarr 2013). A particu-
larly important mechanism is assumed to be with learning between network
members, either horizontally (Hobolth and Martinsen 2013; Zito 2009) or
vertically, the network’s nodal player becoming a ‘teacher of norms’ (Versluis
and Tarr 2013). As networks for information sharing, exchange of views/
experiences and learning, EANs can improve compliance more effectively
than control, deterrence and sanctions (Hobolth and Martinsen 2013).
Although the existing literature has advanced insights into the impact of
individual networks, we lack research which compares the impact of different
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networks, across time, policy sectors and member states in order to under-
stand and explain whether, when and why EANs improve national implemen-
tation and enforcement of EU law and policies.
Normative aspects
Most literature stresses EANs’ positive contribution to European integration –
their ability to harmonize rules, to create domestic change and to improve
compliance (Bach and Newman 2010; Eberlein and Grande 2005; Eberlein
and Newman 2008; Hobolth and Martinsen 2013; Maggetti 2014a, 2014b;
Maggetti and Gilardi 2014; Martens 2008b; Slaughter 2004). At the same
time, EANs raise a set of normative issues, related to the fact that EANs are
mostly made up of civil servants and experts from the national and European
administrations (Cengiz 2016). Mandating such administrative actors implies
processes of depoliticization, devolving power towards the administration
and blurring the lines of political responsibility (Bach et al. 2015; Blauberger
and Rittberger 2015: 374). The increased autonomy of regulatory networks
reduces the influence of formal rule-making institutions (Danielsen and
Yesilkagit 2014: 354), thus disempowering (supra)national majoritarian
institutions and potentially the Commission as the Union’s core executive.
Accordingly, decision-making influence further drifts away from national
constituencies. As observed by Raustiala (2002: 83) for trans-governmental
networks more broadly, these developments are at odds with the thrust of
legitimacy theory. While improving effectiveness and rule harmonization,
EANs may seriously damage EU legitimacy.
Furthermore, accountability problems loom large (Bignami 2005; Cengiz
2016; Papadopoulos 2007; Smismans 2008).The selective composition and
informality of many EAN privileges certain interests at the expense of
others (Eberlein and Grande 2005: 106; Papadopoulos 2007; Smismans
2008). Their weak visibility insulates them from public scrutiny. Their decisions
are not exposed to parliamentarian involvement, let alone control. Inter-
actions between qualified peers cannot substitute public accountability
(Papadopoulos 2007). As argued by Martinsen and Jørgensen (2010), EANs
perform poorly from an accountability perspective: there is no forum for
holding EANs accountable, they are not obliged to justify their actions and
the lack of hierarchy diffuses who is to be held accountable.
Partly remedying these deficiencies, Bignami (2005) has argued that EANs
only will emerge if democratically elected governments agree on the under-
lying policy objectives. Furthermore, governance in networks may foster
legitimacy by allowing affected actors to participate in decision-making,
which may enhance the acceptance of outcomes and the engagement of
citizens more broadly (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009: 144). However,
such inclusiveness of EANs is still up for an empirical test.
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Conclusion and research agenda
An important aspect of the European Administrative Space are European
administrative networks, which may fulfil a variety of tasks in the realm of
the preparation, making, implementation or enforcement of EU policies.
Whereas several other types of networks have received ample attention by
the EAS literature, this is not the case for implementation networks. This
article set out to describe and integrate the existing insights on these imple-
menting EANs, which are scattered over four different literatures, with the
purpose of developing a research agenda on this phenomenon.
The first research theme has been EAN establishment. This is primarily seen
as driven by rational considerations, either captured in functionalist or stra-
tegic terms – highlighting considerations of effectiveness, power, costs and
reputation. In doing so, this literature has broken with the legacy of traditional
delegation studies (see Huber and Shipan 2014), which puts substantive policy
preferences of principals and agents centre stage for the understanding of
processes of delegation. Application of such theories to EAN establishment,
which has been seen as a type of delegation, hence seems fruitful. Further-
more, research on the relative importance of the two types of considerations
is still in its early stages. Refinement and testing of the integrative theoretical
framework by Blauberger and Rittberger (2015) seems warranted. Moreover,
the absence of sociological institutionalist theories is striking: processes of
socialization, mimicking and learning between sectors, or the activities of
norm entrepreneurs, can be expected to predicate EAN establishment.
Finally, most empirical work has been Y-oriented, implying a teleological
‘reading back’ of intentions behind the creation of EANs from the functions
that they in fact perform (Thatcher 2011). In order to really determine the con-
ditions of EAN establishment, we should focus on the independent variables
and see whether indeed our theories on EAN establishment withstand empiri-
cal scrutiny. In doing so, it would be welcome to broaden the empirical scope
towards policy domains that have not yet been studied.
EAN functioning, secondly, seems similarly variant. Findings of active and
stable co-operation coexist with studies displaying variant co-operation. The
level of EAN control by the Commission seems equally disputed. Also, the
results so far are based on a selective set of North-western countries, which
begs for a more broader scope of research. In addition, more fine-grained
comparative analyses are required. First, a theoretical gap concerns explicit
modelling of the multiple P-A relations (Dehousse 2008). A particularly inter-
esting question is under what conditions the Commission tries to ‘stack the
deck’ in favour of compliance by enhancing national agencies’ autonomy
vis-à-vis the government (Busuioc [2016]; Yesilkagit [2011]). Second, much is
to be gained from behavioural analyses of network functioning, as well as
the application of social network analysis, which is highly suited to analyse
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the extent and antecedents of co-operation and control in networks. This
seems especially important because the literature has primarily focused on
Commission control, neglecting the question of dominance by powerful
national network members (but see Maggetti and Gilardi 2011). Third, the
role of the Commission could be studied more extensively; to what extent
and under what conditions does it play an effective role of ‘teacher of
norms’ (Versluis and Tarr 2013)? Moreover, how can we explain the differences
in effectiveness, co-operation, control and impact on its members? The field
could progress greatly through systematic comparative analysis and expla-
nation of variance in network functioning, going beyond North-western
member states.
EAN impact, thirdly, has mainly been addressed through rationalist
approaches, connecting impact to intentional design, control problems, and
the role of agencies among other factors. Other scholars have theorized
impact using sociological institutionalism, highlighting the role of mutual
adaptation and learning. On a theoretical ground, scholars tend to disagree
on EANs’ impact on implementation. However, empirical research on
whether, when and why EANs do indeed improve national implementation
of EU law and policies is scarce. Thus, we call for research on the actual
ability of EANs to close the implementation gap. We need more systematic
and, indeed, comparative studies to explain if and why EANs matter in the
European executive order.
Finally, the normative aspects of implementing EANs have been underem-
phasized, with the exception of some contributions suggesting problems with
legitimacy and accountability. The study of European administrative networks
should involve further critical examination of their implications for legitimacy
and accountability – both negative and positive. A starting point could be to
inquire into relations and interaction between network peers, examine man-
dating procedures, control and shadows of hierarchy – and embark on an
accountability study of EANs beyond the classic input–output dichotomy.
Finally, the question whether inclusiveness of EANs may offset these negative
side effects, is yet to be determined.
Notes
1. Whereas the term was originally coined by Olsen (2003), he referred to a differ-
ent phenomenon: the convergence of national administrations.
2. In selecting the consulted literature, which is fully listed in our Online Appendix,
we used a snowballing strategy. Given the limited length of this article, we
focused primarily on international journal articles. We mostly excluded the litera-
ture on EU agencies, except for studies of agencies with a networked structure
(Dehousse 1997, 2008; Groenleer et al. 2010; Levi-Faur 2011; Versluis and Tarr
2013).
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 431
3. Please note that the distinction with European agencies may be thin: many
agencies have a networked character, involving national agencies or administra-
tors in their organization (Busuioc 2016; Dehousse 1997; Groenleer et al. 2010;
Levi-Faur 2011; Versluis and Tarr 2013). Yet, analytically speaking, networks
and agencies are seen as two alternative regulatory design options (Blauberger
and Rittberger 2015; Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; Thatcher and Coen 2008).
4. The distinction between functionalist and strategic accounts is often hard to
draw: various ‘functionalist’ accounts focus on the preferences of the main
principals involved in EAN creation (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Eberlein and
Newman 2008).
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